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**OFFICE OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION**

**Report on the Results of Operations
for
San Diego Gas & Electric Company
Southern California Gas Company
Test Year 2019
General Rate Case**

Post-Test Year Ratemaking

San Francisco, California
April 13, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POST-TEST YEAR RATEMAKING 1

I. INTRODUCTION..... 1

II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 2

 A. SDG&E PTY Revenue Increases 2

 B. SoCalGas PTY Revenue Increases 3

 C. ORA’s PTYR Recommendations..... 4

 1. GRC Term 4

 2. PTYR Mechanism..... 4

 3. Other PTYR Issues..... 4

 4. Alternate PTYR Mechanism..... 5

III. BACKGROUND 5

 A. Utilities are not Automatically Entitled to Post-Test Year Revenue Increases..... 5

 B. Post-Test Year Revenue Increases in Recent General Rate Cases 6

IV. SEMPRA UTILITIES’ POST-TEST YEAR RATEMAKING PROPOSALS 8

 A. GRC Term 8

 B. Post-Test Year Ratemaking Mechanism 9

 1. O&M Expenses..... 9

 a. O&M Margin Escalation..... 9

 b. Medical Cost Escalation 10

 2. Capital Additions..... 11

 a. GRC Incremental Adjustment..... 12

 b. SoCalGas PSEP Adjustment..... 13

 c. Rate Base..... 14

 C. Z-Factor Mechanism..... 15

 D. Regulatory Filings..... 15

V. ORA’s POST-TEST YEAR RATEMAKING RECOMMENDATIONS 16

 A. GRC Term 16

B. ORA’s Primary PTYR Mechanism Provides Reasonable GRC Revenue Increases.....	17
1. Perspective on SDG&E’s and SoCalGas’ Request.....	17
2. ORA’s Position.....	19
3. Attrition Revenues for SDG&E.....	19
4. Attrition Revenues for SoCalGas.....	19
C. Regulatory Filings.....	20
D. Z-Factor Mechanism.....	20
E. Rate Base Adjustments.....	21
F. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.....	21
VI. ORA’s ALTERNATE POST-TEST YEAR RATEMAKING MECHANISM.....	22
A. O&M Expense Adjustments.....	22
1. O&M (Labor and Non-Labor) Margin Escalation.....	22
2. O&M Escalation Rate Updates.....	23
3. Medical Cost Escalation.....	24
B. Capital-Related Adjustments.....	24
1. GRC Incremental Adjustment.....	24
2. SoCalGas PSEP Adjustment.....	25
3. Rate Base.....	25
WITNESS QUALIFICATIONS.....	26
<i>ATTACHMENTS</i>	

POST-TEST YEAR RATEMAKING

I. INTRODUCTION

This exhibit presents the analyses and recommendations of the Office of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA) regarding the Post-Test Year Ratemaking (PTYR) proposals of San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) and Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas or SCG), otherwise known as the Sempra Utilities (Sempra), for their Test Year (TY) 2019 General Rate Case (GRC).

Sempra proposes a 4-year GRC term comprising a test year (2019) and three post-test years (2020, 2021 and 2022). SDG&E seeks Commission authorization for an attrition mechanism which would yield estimated revenue increases of \$158.5 million (7.22%) for 2020, \$121.4 million (5.16%) for 2021, and \$124.7 million (5.04%) for 2022.¹ SoCalGas seeks Commission authorization for an attrition mechanism which would yield estimated revenue increases of \$255.8 million (8.56%) for 2020, \$201.1 million (6.20%) for 2021, and \$213.1 million (6.18%) for 2022.^{2,3}

The figures presented in this exhibit compare ORA's and the utilities' proposed post-test year revenue increases without the impacts from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA).

¹ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-ii.

² Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-ii.

³ SoCalGas' request includes Pipeline Safety Enhancement Plan (PSEP) capital-related revenue increases of \$15.7 million in 2020, \$38.9 million in 2021, and \$46.3 million in 2022, associated with proposed capital expenditures for those years. ORA estimates that sans PSEP, SoCalGas' proposed post-test year revenue increases would be \$240.1 million (8.03%) for 2020, \$162.2 million (5.00%) for 2021, and \$166.8 million (4.84%) for 2022.

1 **II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

2 ORA agrees with SDG&E’s and SoCalGas’ proposal for three post-test years,
3 and does not oppose a Post-Test Year Ratemaking (PTYR) mechanism which
4 provides them with a reasonable level of revenue increases in 2020, 2021 and 2022.

5 ORA recommends revenue increases of 4.00% per
6 year in 2020, 2021 and 2022 for SDG&E and SoCalGas,
7 plus additional revenues for SoCalGas’ post-test year
8 Pipeline Safety Enhancement Plan (PSEP) capital
9 additions. This effectively increases SoCalGas’ attrition
10 adjustments to 4.56%, 5.25%, and 5.40% for 2020, 2021,
11 and 2022, respectively.

ORA recommends annual revenue increases of 4.00% for SDG&E and SoCalGas in 2020, 2021, and 2022, plus additional revenues for SoCalGas’ post-test year PSEP capital additions

12 **A. SDG&E PTY Revenue Increases**

13 Based on ORA’s forecast of SDG&E’s 2019 revenue requirement, ORA’s
14 recommended PTYR methodology yields estimated revenue increases of \$79.6
15 million for 2020, \$82.8 million for 2021, and \$86.1 million for 2022.⁴ These post-test
16 year increases result in revenue requirement levels equal to \$2.071 billion in 2020,
17 \$2.153 billion in 2021, and \$2.240 billion in 2022.

18 Based on SDG&E’s and ORA’s 2019 respective revenue requirement
19 forecasts, the differences between SDG&E’s proposed and ORA’s recommended
20 PTYR revenue increases for the three post-test years are shown below:

21

⁴ See Ex. ORA-34 for ORA’s recommended attrition increases for SDG&E with the impacts of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.

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Table 31-1
SDG&E Proposed vs. ORA Recommended
Post-Test Year Revenue Increases for 2020, 2021 and 2022
(in Millions of Dollars)

Description (a)	2020 (b)	2021 (c)	2022 (d)
SDG&E Proposed ⁵	\$158.5	\$121.4	\$124.7
ORA Recommended	\$79.6	\$82.8	\$86.1
Amount SDG&E>ORA	\$78.9	\$38.6	\$38.6

5 **B. SoCalGas PTY Revenue Increases**

6 Based on ORA’s forecast of SoCalGas’ 2019 revenue requirement, ORA’s
7 recommended PTYR methodology yields estimated revenue increases of \$110.7
8 million for 2020, \$115.1 million for 2021, and \$119.8 million for 2022. In addition,
9 based on the Pipeline Safety Enhancement Plan (PSEP) capital expenditure
10 forecasts presented in Ex. ORA-03, ORA estimates PSEP-related revenue
11 increases of \$15.5 million, \$36.7 million, and \$44.7 million for 2020, 2021, and 2022,
12 respectively. Hence, ORA forecasts revenue increases totaling \$126.2 million for
13 2020, \$151.8 million for 2021, and \$164.5 million for 2022.⁶ These post-test year
14 increases result in revenue requirement levels equal to \$2.894 billion in 2020,
15 \$3.046 billion in 2021, and \$3.211 billion in 2022.

16 Based on SoCalGas’ and ORA’s 2019 respective revenue requirement
17 forecasts, the differences between SoCalGas’ proposed and ORA’s recommended
18 PTYR revenue increases for the three post-test years are shown below:

19

⁵ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-ii.

⁶ See Ex. ORA-34 for ORA’s recommended attrition increases for SoCalGas with the impacts of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.

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Table 31-2
SoCalGas Proposed vs. ORA Recommended
Post-Test Year Revenue Increases for 2020, 2021 and 2022
(in Millions of Dollars)

Description (a)	2020 (b)	2021 (c)	2022 (d)
SoCalGas Proposed ⁷	\$255.8	\$201.1	\$213.1
ORA Recommended	\$126.2	\$151.8	\$164.5
Amount SoCalGas>ORA	\$129.6	\$49.3	\$48.6

5

C. ORA's PTYR Recommendations

6

1. GRC Term

7

ORA agrees with SDG&E's and SoCalGas' proposal for a 4-year GRC term

8

(2019-2022).

9

2. PTYR Mechanism

10

ORA recommends a PTYR mechanism whereby attrition base revenue

11

increases for SDG&E and SoCalGas are set at 4.00% for 2020, 2021 and 2022, plus

12

additional revenues for SoCalGas' post-test year PSEP capital additions. ORA's

13

recommended percentage increase is guided by a recent forecast of Consumer

14

Prices, attrition increases adopted by the Commission in recent large energy utility

15

GRCs, and the post-test year revenue increases authorized by the Commission for

16

the Sempra Utilities in Decision (D.) 13-05-010 (TY 2012 GRC) and D.16-06-054

17

(TY 2016 GRC).

18

3. Other PTYR Issues

19

- ORA does not oppose continuation of implementing post-test year revenue requirements annually through the advice letter process.

20

21

- ORA does not oppose continuation of the Z-factor mechanism, but recommends that the mechanism be effective only during the post-test years, and not for the test year.

22

23

24

- ORA will update its post-test year forecasts to reflect the revenue requirement impacts due to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.

25

⁷ Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-ii.

1 **4. Alternate PTYR Mechanism**

2 If the Commission does not adopt ORA’s primary PTYR mechanism, and
3 prefers a mechanism similar to that which SDG&E and SoCalGas proposes, then
4 ORA recommends the following alternative:

- 5 • Regarding post-test year increases for operational expenses:
- 6 ✓ ORA does not oppose the O&M margin escalation rates
7 proposed by SDG&E (2.66% for 2020, 2.59% for 2021, and
8 2.55% for 2022) and SoCalGas (2.70% for 2020, 2.58% for
9 2021, and 2.53% for 2022);
 - 10 ✓ ORA does not oppose SDG&E’s and SoCalGas’ proposal that
11 they be allowed to update their O&M margin escalation rates
12 for the post-test years, but limits should be placed on how
13 much the rates can be adjusted; and
 - 14 ✓ ORA recommends that post-test year medical escalation rates
15 be set at 4.25%, as opposed to SDG&E’s and SoCalGas’
16 proposed escalation rates of 6.50% for 2020, 6.00% for 2021,
17 and 5.50% for 2022.
- 18 • In determining the GRC incremental capital-related attrition
19 allowance, ORA recommends: (a) using an escalated 7-year
20 (2013-2019) average of capital additions instead of a 5-year (2015-
21 2019) average; and (b) using 2017 recorded capital additions, as
22 well as Commission-adopted 2018 and 2019 capital additions
23 forecasts, as part of the 7-year average instead of using SDG&E’s
24 and SoCalGas’ 2017-2019 forecasts.

25 **III. BACKGROUND**

26 **A. Utilities are not Automatically Entitled to Post-Test Year**
27 **Revenue Increases**

28 Before 1982, the base revenue requirement was generally adjusted only
29 during GRC proceedings. In the period between GRC proceedings, base rates
30 would not change, but the utilities received additional income from customer growth.
31 Post-Test Year, otherwise known as attrition, rate adjustments were implemented in
32 the early 1980’s primarily because of the unprecedented high inflation and lower
33 rates of customer growth and sales in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Since the
34 mid-1980’s, inflation has generally declined to more modest historical levels. The
35 utilities have also had various forms of revenue balancing account protection from

1 sales fluctuation. Additionally, utility fuel-related costs that had high volatility, and
2 over which utilities have limited control, were removed from base rates and are now
3 recovered through separate mechanisms with balancing accounts.

4 The GRC proceeding periodically reviews and sets reasonable rates for
5 utilities for a specific test year, in this case, 2019. For the period between GRC
6 proceedings, the Commission has, in some cases, granted attrition-type increases
7 and, in other cases, has not provided such increases. In the past, the Commission
8 has stated:

9 The attrition mechanism is not an entitlement. Nor is it a method of
10 insulating the company from the economic pressures which all
11 business experience...Neither the Constitution nor case law has ever
12 required automatic rate increases between general rate case
13 applications.⁸

14 In Pacific Gas and Electric's (PG&E) 1999 GRC decision, the Commission
15 denied attrition increases for year 2000. In D.02-02-043, the Commission granted
16 PG&E a 2001 attrition increase of approximately \$151 million. In D.03-03-034,
17 however, the Commission denied PG&E's attrition increase request for 2002. It is
18 clear that utilities are not automatically entitled to attrition rate increases between
19 rate cases, even though the Commission has included provisions for post-test year
20 rate relief in some GRC decisions.

21 **B. Post-Test Year Revenue Increases in** 22 **Recent General Rate Cases**

23 Post-Test Year revenue increases granted by the
24 Commission to the large California energy utilities in each of
25 their last two GRCs have been as follows:

26 Sempra Utilities

- 27 • For the Sempra Utilities' 2012 GRC, the Commission authorized
28 attrition increases based on the All-Urban Consumer Price Index

In recent GRCs, large energy utilities have typically received annual post-test year revenue increases ranging from 3.0% to 5.0%

⁸ D.93-12-043, 52 CPUC 2d 471, 492.

- 1 (CPI-U), plus 75 basis points, which translated into increases of
2 2.65% for 2013, 2.75% for 2014, and 2.75% for 2015.⁹
- 3 • The Commission adopted a settlement agreement in the Sempra
4 Utilities' 2016 GRC, authorizing attrition increases of 3.5% per year
5 for 2017 and 2018 for both utilities.¹⁰

6 Southern California Edison

- 7 • For the SCE 2012 GRC, the Commission essentially authorized
8 attrition increases of 3.9% for 2013 and 5.7% for 2014.¹¹
- 9 • For the SCE 2015 GRC, the Commission authorized attrition
10 increases of 4.0% for 2013 and 5.0% for 2014.¹²

11 Pacific Gas and Electric

- 12 • For the PG&E 2014 GRC, the Commission authorized attrition
13 increases of 4.57% for 2015 and 5.0% for 2016.¹³
- 14 • The Commission adopted a settlement agreement in the PG&E
15 2017 GRC, authorizing attrition increases of 5.5% for 2018 and
16 4.3% for 2019.¹⁴

17 With the exception of a few instances, the Commission has generally
18 authorized attrition increases ranging from approximately 3.0% to 5.0% per year for
19 the large energy utilities.

⁹ D.13-05-010, *mimeo.*, at pp. 1010-1011.

¹⁰ D.16-06-054, *mimeo.*, at p. 4.

¹¹ D.12-11-051, *mimeo.*, at p. 3, indicates that, for SCE, the Commission adopted revenue requirement levels of \$5.671 billion for 2012, \$6.078 billion for 2013, and \$6.426 billion for 2014. Based on ORA's calculations, this equates to revenue increases of \$407 million (7.2%) in 2013 and \$348 million (5.7%) in 2014. However, excluding the \$188 million in revenues (see page 13, Table 6, line 3 of SCE's Advice 2826-E, dated December 19, 2012, included as **Attachment 1** to this exhibit) rolled in from SCE's SmartConnect program beginning in 2013 (which were previously recovered through the Edison SmartConnect Balancing Account, or ESCBA), the net post-test year revenue increase would have been \$219 million (3.9%) in 2013.

¹² D.15-11-021, *mimeo.*, at p. 2.

¹³ D.14-08-032, *mimeo.*, at p. 2.

¹⁴ D.17-05-013, *mimeo.*, at p. 2.

1 **IV. SEMPRA UTILITIES' POST-TEST YEAR RATEMAKING**
2 **PROPOSALS**

3 This section briefly summarizes SDG&E's and SoCalGas' proposals
4 regarding the GRC term, Post-Test Year Ratemaking mechanism, Z-factor
5 mechanism, and PTY-related regulatory filings.

6 **A. GRC Term**

7 Both SDG&E and SoCalGas propose a 4-year GRC term (2019-2022) for this
8 GRC cycle.¹⁵ If this proposal is adopted by the Commission, the Sempra Utilities'
9 next rate case would be for TY 2023.

10 SDG&E states that it "...supports the adoption of the 4-year GRC term
11 because it would free up resources needed to litigate a GRC every three years and
12 allow the utility to maintain focus on clean, safe, and reliable operations and
13 customer service. Over the last several years, the GRC process has become more
14 complex and subject to extended delays, which is now compounded by new
15 processes, reviews, and reporting required by the Risk OIR decisions incorporating
16 Safety Model Assessment Proceedings (S-MAP) and Risk Assessment and
17 Mitigation Phase (RAMP)."¹⁶

18 SoCalGas adds that "...[m]oving to a four-year GRC cycle would give both
19 the Commission and the utilities more flexibility to manage additional responsibilities
20 created by the integrated S-MAP, RAMP and GRC proceedings. The four-year GRC
21 term would reduce the administrative burden on all parties, and allow the utility to
22 more effectively operate its business while implementing new risk-mitigation and
23 accountability structures, processes and reporting requirements."¹⁷

¹⁵ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-ii; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-ii.

¹⁶ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-2, lines 15-21.

¹⁷ Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-3, lines 9-13.

1 **B. Post-Test Year Ratemaking Mechanism**

2 SDG&E seeks post-test year revenue increases of \$158.5 million (7.22%) for
3 2020, \$121.4 million (5.16%) for 2021, and \$124.7 million (5.04%) for 2022.¹⁸

4 SoCalGas seeks post-test year revenue increases of \$255.8 million (8.56%) for
5 2020, \$201.1 million (6.20%) for 2021, and \$213.1 million (6.18%) for 2022.¹⁹

6 There are two basic components to the Sempra Utilities’ proposed PTYR
7 mechanism: (1) operations and maintenance (O&M) escalation; and (2) capital
8 additions.

9 **1. O&M Expenses**

10 SDG&E and SoCalGas each propose a PTYR mechanism that escalates
11 adopted 2019 O&M expenses (labor, non-labor, and medical). SDG&E and
12 SoCalGas propose to:²⁰

- 13 • absorb increased operating costs from customer growth through
14 productivity improvements;
- 15 • treat miscellaneous revenues as fixed amounts without escalation;
16 and
- 17 • apply franchise fees and uncollectibles as fixed rates for the post-
18 test year period (i.e., franchise fees and uncollectible expense
19 items are not subject to escalation).

20 **a. O&M Margin Escalation**

21 SDG&E and SoCalGas propose a PTYR mechanism that escalates labor
22 costs using the 1st Quarter 2017 IHS Markit Global Insight’s Power Planner (Global
23 Insight or GI) forecast, as described in Exhibits SDG&E-39 and SCG-40. The two
24 utilities also rely on various Global Insight cost series to develop escalation indices
25 for non-labor costs.²¹

¹⁸ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-ii.

¹⁹ Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-ii.

²⁰ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-4, lines 18-23; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-5, lines 6-14.

²¹ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-4, line 28 thru p. KJD-5, line 6; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-5, lines 25-29, and line 31.

1 For simplicity in calculating post-test year O&M escalation, the Sempra
 2 Utilities then created a single weighted-average escalation factor for each year,
 3 covering labor and non-labor expenses.^{22,23} SDG&E and SoCalGas propose the
 4 following post-test year O&M escalation rates and associated revenue requirement:

5 **Table 31-3**
 6 **SDG&E and SoCalGas Post-Test Year Labor & Non-Labor Escalation**²⁴
 7 **(in Millions of Dollars)**

O&M Margin Escalation	2020		2021		2022	
SDG&E	2.66%	\$20.4	2.59%	\$20.5	2.55%	\$20.6
SoCalGas	2.70%	\$38.5	2.58%	\$37.8	2.53%	\$38.1

8 SDG&E and SoCalGas propose a one-time update their cost escalation
 9 forecasts as part of their GRC Update Testimony. The Sempra Utilities propose
 10 using the Global Insight forecasts available in June 2018 to determine the 2019
 11 labor and non-labor O&M escalation indices; the resultant post-test year O&M
 12 escalation amounts are then fixed throughout the attrition period (i.e., not updated
 13 every year to reflect more current escalation forecasts).²⁵

14 **b. Medical Cost Escalation**

15 The Sempra Utilities state that "...[m]edical costs have grown at a higher rate
 16 than the broad-based inflation in the general economy..."²⁶ and because post-test
 17 year "...medical costs are expected to increase above general utility cost inflation,

²² Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-5, lines 7-9; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-5, lines 29-30.

²³ SDG&E and SoCalGas refer to the single weighted-average escalation factor as the Gas and Electric O&M Utility Input Price Index (GEOMPI).

²⁴ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-5, line 10; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-6, line 2.

²⁵ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-5, lines 12-16; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-6, lines 4-8.

²⁶ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-5, lines 19-20; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-6, lines 11-12.

1 medical costs are escalated separately based on actuarial forecasts...by Willis
 2 Towers Watson...,²⁷ as described in Exhibits SDG&E-28 and SCG-30.

3 SDG&E and SoCalGas propose the following post-test year medical
 4 escalation rates and associated revenue requirement:

5 **Table 31-4**
 6 **SDG&E and SoCalGas Post-Test Year Medical Cost Escalation²⁸**
 7 **(in Millions of Dollars)**

Medical Cost Adjustment	2020		2021		2022	
SDG&E	6.50%	\$1.8	6.00%	\$1.8	5.50%	\$1.8
SoCalGas	6.50%	\$4.5	6.00%	\$4.4	5.50%	\$4.3

8 The two utilities note that "...this forecasted rate is similar to the post-test year
 9 medical expense escalation rate (7.0%) that Southern California Edison Company
 10 (SCE) proposed in its Test Year 2018 GRC."²⁹

11 **2. Capital Additions**

12 SDG&E and SoCalGas request the following post-test year capital-related
 13 revenue requirement adjustments:

14 **Table 31-5**
 15 **SDG&E and SoCalGas Post-Test Year Capital-Related Revenue Increases³⁰**
 16 **(in Millions of Dollars)**

Capital-Related Adjustment	2020	2021	2022
SDG&E	\$135.6	\$98.4	\$101.5
SoCalGas	\$212.0	\$158.2	\$170.0

17 SDG&E's forecast comprises GRC incremental capital-related revenue
 18 adjustments, while SoCalGas' forecast comprises GRC incremental and PSEP
 19 capital-related revenue adjustments.

²⁷ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-5, lines 20-23; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-6, lines 12-15.

²⁸ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-6, line 2; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-6, line 20.

²⁹ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-5, lines 25-26; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-6, lines 16-18.

³⁰ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-8, line 3; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-9, line 2.

1 **a. GRC Incremental Adjustment**

2 SDG&E and SoCalGas request the following post-test year GRC incremental
3 capital-related revenue requirement adjustments:

4 **Table 31-6**
5 **SDG&E and SoCalGas Post-Test Year GRC Incremental**
6 **Capital-Related Revenue Increases³¹**
7 **(in Millions of Dollars)**

Capital-Related Adjustment	2020	2021	2022
SDG&E	\$135.6	\$98.4	\$101.5
SoCalGas	\$196.3	\$119.2	\$123.7

8 The Sempra Utilities propose an adjustment to capital-related revenue
9 requirements³² to reflect the cost of estimated post-test year plant additions (capital
10 additions net of retirements) for rate base, based on using "...the escalated five-year
11 average level of capital additions (2015-2016 recorded and 2017-2019 forecast as
12 presented in this TY 2019 GRC) as a proxy for the annual PTY 2020, 2021, and
13 2022 actual level of capital additions."^{33,34}

14 SDG&E and SoCalGas indicate that this methodology is similar to the PTY
15 mechanism in the PG&E 2014 and 2017 GRCs, which relied on a 7-year average of
16 capital additions to derive post-test year capital-related revenue requirement
17 adjustments. However, they assert that using "...a five-year average of capital
18 additions...better captures the current utility business environment..."³⁵ SDG&E

³¹ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-8, line 3; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-9, line 2.

³² Comprising authorized return on rate base, depreciation expense, and taxes.

³³ Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-7, lines 15-17. ORA chooses not to quote Ex. SDG&E-43-R as it presents the same argument as SCG, though worded slightly differently.

³⁴ The 2015-2019 recorded and forecast capital additions would be escalated to the appropriate PTY dollars and then averaged. Capital escalation rates would be based on IHS Markit major plant category indices as described in Ex. SDG&E-39 and Ex. SCG-40.

³⁵ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KDJ-7, lines 2-3; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-8, lines 1-3.

1 and SoCalGas state that their capital programs are “...continuing to evolve, with a
 2 primary focus on increasing investment in utility safety and reliability, while
 3 supporting California’s clean energy and environmental initiatives.”³⁶ The two
 4 utilities also assert that a five-year average serves to “...normalize year-to-year
 5 variability in utility spending and eliminates the administrative burden of conducting
 6 line-by-line reviews...” of forecasted capital spending.³⁷

7 **b. SoCalGas PSEP Adjustment**

8 In addition to the GRC-related incremental capital-related revenue
 9 requirement adjustment shown on the table above, SoCalGas also adds a
 10 component for forecasted Pipeline Safety Enhance Plan (PSEP) capital additions,
 11 which are booked to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Accounts 376
 12 (Distribution Mains) and 367 (Transmission Mains):

13 **Table 31-7**
 14 **SoCalGas Post-Test Year PSEP Capital Additions**
 15 **(in Millions of Dollars)**

PSEP	2020	2021	2022
Capital Additions (direct costs) ³⁸	\$177.9	\$310.4	\$115.7
Capital Additions (fully loaded and escalated) ³⁹	\$218.6	\$389.5	\$148.6
Capital-Related Revenue Increase ⁴⁰	\$15.7	\$38.9	\$46.3

16 According to SoCalGas, D.16-08-003 authorized the Sempra Utilities to
 17 include certain PSEP costs as part of the 2019 GRC.⁴¹ SoCalGas states that the

³⁶ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KDJ-7, lines 4-5; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-8, lines 3-5.

³⁷ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KDJ-7, lines 9-11; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-8, lines 9-10.

³⁸ Ex. SCG-44-WP-R, p. JAM PSEP-5, sum of the direct costs shown on lines 1 and 9 for years 2020, 2021, and 2022.

³⁹ Ex. SCG-44-WP-R, p. JAM PSEP-5, line 17 for years 2020, 2021, and 2022.

⁴⁰ Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-10, line 10.

1 PSEP capital-related revenue requirement adjustment "...is necessary because
 2 majority of PSEP capital expenditures are expected to close to plant in service in
 3 2020, 2021, and 2022, and therefore the associated capital-related costs will not be
 4 fully reflected in the TY 2019 revenue requirement."^{42,43}

5 SoCalGas' total (GRC incremental and PSEP) capital-related revenue
 6 adjustment is shown on the following table:

7 **Table 31-8**
 8 **SoCalGas Total Post-Test Year Capital-Related Revenue Increases**⁴⁴
 9 **(in Millions of Dollars)**

Capital-Related Adjustment	2020	2021	2022
Incremental Capital-Related	\$196.3	\$119.2	\$123.7
PSEP Capital-Related	\$15.7	\$38.9	\$46.3
Total	\$212.0	\$158.2	\$170.0

10 SDG&E does not forecast any attrition-year PSEP capital additions or capital-
 11 related revenue requirement increases.

12 **c. Rate Base**

13 For the post-test years, SDG&E and SoCalGas are "...not proposing to adjust
 14 the rate base elements of materials and supplies, customer advances, or working
 15 cash."⁴⁵ However, the two utilities do propose rate base adjustments "...for the
 16 phase down of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 168(k) bonus depreciation and
 17 the repairs deduction as ordered in D.16-06-054."⁴⁶

(continued from previous page)

⁴¹ Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-9, lines 6-13.

⁴² Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-9, lines 19-21.

⁴³ The details associated with the PSEP projects and costs are presented in Ex. SCG-15.

⁴⁴ Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-10, line 14.

⁴⁵ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-6, lines 10-11; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-7, lines 6-7.

⁴⁶ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-6, lines 11-12; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-6, lines 7-9.

1 **C. Z-Factor Mechanism**

2 The Sempra Utilities propose, for this 2019-2022 GRC cycle, to keep in place
3 the existing, currently authorized, Z-factor mechanism. The mechanism uses eight
4 criteria outlined in D.94-06-011 to "...identify exogenous cost changes that qualify for
5 rate adjustments prior to the next GRC test year. If all eight criteria are met, the Z-
6 factor mechanism allows for rate adjustments for only the portion of the Z-factor
7 costs not already contained..." in SDG&E's and SoCalGas' respective "...annual
8 revenue requirement and only for costs that exceed a \$5 million deductible per
9 event."⁴⁷ Neither utility proposes to change the current identification of Z-factors.

10 In case of a potential Z-factor event, SDG&E and/or SoCalGas would
11 "...notify the Commission's Executive Director by letter, providing all relevant and
12 available information about the event, and will activate the Z-factor Memorandum
13 Account for potential entries."⁴⁸ Following such notification, SDG&E and/or
14 SoCalGas "...would have the option to file an application for a revenue requirement
15 supplement if the Z-factor event exceeds the \$5 million per event deductible."⁴⁹

16 **D. Regulatory Filings**

17 The Sempra Utilities currently update their attrition revenue requirements
18 through an annual advice letter filing, and they propose continuing the process for
19 the 2020-2022 post-test years.

20 SDG&E and SoCalGas would make their respective annual PTY advice letter
21 filing on or before November 1 (beginning November 2019) to update the authorized
22 revenue requirement, according to the adopted PTY ratemaking mechanism. "The
23 resulting customer rate adjustments to recover the updated revenue requirement
24 would be effective the following January 1. The advice letter will contain all

⁴⁷ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-8, lines 8-11; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-11, lines 2-5.

⁴⁸ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-8, lines 14-16; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-11, lines 6-8.

⁴⁹ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-8, lines 17-18; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-11, lines 9-10.

1 calculations necessary to update the revenue requirement for the subsequent
2 year.”⁵⁰

3 **V. ORA’s POST-TEST YEAR RATEMAKING RECOMMENDATIONS**

4 ORA does not oppose a PTYR mechanism which will provide SDG&E and
5 SoCalGas with revenue increases in 2020, 2021, and 2022, but recommends one
6 which would result in more reasonable attrition year
7 revenue increases than the amounts requested by the
8 Sempra Utilities.

ORA’s proposed PTYR mechanism would provide SDG&E and SoCalGas with higher revenue increases compared to their last GRCs but lower increases compared to their requests

9 **A. GRC Term**

10 Both SDG&E and SoCalGas propose a 4-year
11 GRC term (2019-2022) for this GRC cycle,⁵¹ comprising
12 a test year (2019) and three post-test years (2020, 2021, and 2022). ORA
13 **STRONGLY** supports and agrees with Sempra’s request, and urges the
14 Commission to adopt the proposal.⁵²

15 With a 3-year GRC cycle, as currently specified in the Rate Case Plan, test
16 years of the initial case serve as base years for the following rate case. This
17 presents issues because recorded test year costs may not be representative of
18 future costs, as utilities often initiate new programs during the test year, and initial
19 costs may not reflect a more stable or steady-state level of expenses or
20 expenditures. A 4-year GRC term allows for better utility financial and operational
21 management of spending and investment.

⁵⁰ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-9, lines 3-5; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-11, lines 15-18.

⁵¹ Ex. SDG&E-43-R, p. KJD-ii; Ex. SCG-44-R, p. JAM-ii.

⁵² ORA will propose 4-year GRC terms for PG&E and SCE in their next GRC applications (TY2020 for PG&E and TY2021 for SCE).

1 A 4-year term for this rate case would also be consistent with SDG&E’s and
2 SoCalGas’ GRCs for Test Years 2008 (2008-2011) and 2012 (2012-2015). If the
3 Commission adopts a 4-year GRC cycle for the Sempra Utilities, their next rate case
4 would be for Test Year 2023.

5 In the Sempra Utilities’ 2016 GRC, ORA, SDG&E, and SoCalGas reached a
6 settlement on a third attrition year in which both utilities would have received a 4.3%
7 revenue increase for 2019. Several Parties opposed the proposed settlement and,
8 ultimately, the Commission did not adopt it. In retrospect, adopting a 4.3% increase
9 for 2019 would have saved the ratepayers millions of dollars compared to the 10.9%
10 and 21.7% revenue increases (over 2018 authorized revenues) sought by SDG&E
11 and SoCalGas, respectively, for 2019 in this GRC. ORA recommends that the
12 Commission authorize a third attrition year (in 2022) for this GRC term.⁵³

13 **B. ORA’s Primary PTYR Mechanism Provides Reasonable GRC** 14 **Revenue Increases**

15 SDG&E seeks post-test year revenue increases of \$158.5 million (7.22%) for
16 2020, \$121.4 million (5.16%) for 2021, and \$124.7 million (5.04%) for 2022,⁵⁴ while
17 SoCalGas seeks revenue increases of \$255.8 million (8.56%) for 2020, \$201.1
18 million (6.20%) for 2021, and \$213.1 million (6.18%) for 2022.⁵⁵ ORA recommends
19 post-test year GRC revenue increases of 4.00% in 2020, 2021 and 2022, for both
20 SDG&E and SoCalGas, plus additional revenues for SoCalGas’ post-test year PSEP
21 capital additions.

22 **1. Perspective on SDG&E’s and SoCalGas’ Request**

23 The Sempra Utilities’ proposed attrition increases in this rate case are higher
24 than the increases granted by the Commission in their past two GRCs. As
25 discussed in the “Background” section of this exhibit, the Commission has found it

⁵³ “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” George Santayana, author from the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.

⁵⁴ Ex. SDG&E-43, p. KJD-ii.

⁵⁵ Ex. SCG-44, p. JAM-ii.

1 reasonable to adopt PTYR mechanisms providing attrition increases for California
2 energy utilities based on forecasted Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates, or similar
3 methods. In many cases, ORA has supported and recommended using the CPI as
4 a basis for determining attrition increases.

5 For its 2012 GRC, Sempra proposed separate formulas applied to the O&M-
6 related and capital-related revenue requirements. In D.13-05-010, the Commission
7 adopted a mechanism for SDG&E and SoCalGas which allowed attrition increases
8 of CPI plus 75 basis points.⁵⁶ In that decision, the Commission stated:

9 ...we do not adopt the PTY ratemaking framework that SDG&E and
10 SoCalGas have proposed as it would essentially lead us down a path
11 that allows SDG&E and SoCalGas to recover much of the PTY costs
12 and expenses that they incur. SDG&E and SoCalGas should only be
13 given a reasonable opportunity to ensure their authorized rate of
14 return, and not a mechanism that brings them closer to achieving that
15 target.⁵⁷

16 ...it is reasonable to add 75 basis points (0.75%) to DRA's
17 recommended percentages, as the attrition adjustments that should
18 be adopted for the PTY period. Adding 75 basis points to DRA's
19 recommended percentages will align the attrition adjustment for the
20 Applicants closer to what we have done in other recent GRC
21 decisions, while recognizing that attrition increases for the PTY
22 period should reflect current economic circumstances.⁵⁸

23 In D.16-06-054, by adopting a settlement agreement for the 2016 GRC, the
24 Commission authorized attrition increases of 3.5% per year for 2017 and 2018, for
25 both utilities.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ D.13-05-010, *mimeo.*, at p. 1010.

⁵⁷ D.13-05-010, *mimeo.*, at p. 1010.

⁵⁸ D.13-05-010, *mimeo.*, at pp. 1010-1011.

⁵⁹ D.16-06-054, *mimeo.*, at p. 4.

1 **2. ORA’s Position**

2 For this rate case, ORA proposes attrition increases for both utilities, equal to
3 4.00% per year for 2020, 2021, and 2022, plus additional revenues for SoCalGas’
4 post-test year PSEP capital additions. ORA’s recommendation is guided by:

- 5 • a recent forecast of the annual percent change in Consumer Prices,
6 equal to 2.8% for 2020, 2.6% for 2021, and 2.4% for 2022;⁶⁰
- 7 • recognition of capital investment programs which require additional
8 revenues above a strict increase in Consumer Prices;
- 9 • attrition increases adopted by the Commission in recent large
10 energy utility GRCs; and
- 11 • the two most recent post-test year percentage increases adopted
12 for the Sempra Utilities in D.13-05-010 and D.16-06-054.

13 ORA’s recommended 4.00% annual post-test year revenue increase for this
14 GRC (plus additional PSEP revenues for SoCalGas) is higher than the most recent
15 post-test year increases adopted by the Commission for the Sempra Utilities’ past
16 two GRCs (Test Years 2012 and 2016).

17 **3. Attrition Revenues for SDG&E**

18 Based on ORA’s forecast of SDG&E’s 2019 revenue requirement,⁶¹ ORA’s
19 recommended PTYR methodology yields estimated revenue increases of \$79.6
20 million for 2020, \$82.8 million for 2021, and \$86.1 million for 2022. These post-test
21 year increases result in revenue requirement levels equal to \$2.071 billion in 2020,
22 \$2.153 billion in 2021, and \$2.240 billion in 2022.

23 **4. Attrition Revenues for SoCalGas**

24 Based on ORA’s forecast of SoCalGas’ 2019 revenue requirement,⁶² ORA’s
25 recommended PTYR methodology yields estimated revenue increases of \$110.7
26 million for 2020, \$115.1 million for 2021, and \$119.8 million for 2022. In addition,

⁶⁰ IHS Markit US Economic Outlook, January 2018, page 13, Summary of the US Economy, Prices & Wages Percent Change, Consumer Prices. (See [Attachment 2.](#))

⁶¹ See Ex. ORA-02.

⁶² See Ex. ORA-02.

1 based on the PSEP capital expenditure forecasts presented in Ex. ORA-03, ORA
2 estimates⁶³ PSEP-related revenue increases of \$15.5 million, \$36.7 million, and
3 \$44.7 million for 2020, 2021, and 2022, respectively, in contrast to SoCalGas'
4 forecasted increases of \$15.7 million, \$38.9 million, and \$46.3 million. Hence, ORA
5 forecasts revenue increases totaling \$126.2 million for 2020, \$151.8 million for 2021,
6 and \$164.5 million for 2022.⁶⁴ These post-test year increases result in revenue
7 requirement levels equal to \$2.894 billion in 2020, \$3.046 billion in 2021, and \$3.211
8 billion in 2022.

9 **C. Regulatory Filings**

10 SDG&E and SoCalGas currently update their attrition revenue requirements
11 through an annual advice letter filing, and they propose continuing the process of
12 implementing post-test year revenue requirements annually through the advice letter
13 process. ORA agrees with this request.

14 **D. Z-Factor Mechanism**

15 The Sempra Utilities propose continuation of the existing, currently
16 authorized, Z-factor mechanism which uses eight criteria outlined in D.94-06-011,
17 and a \$5 million per event deductible.

18 ORA does not oppose continuation of the Z-factor mechanism, but
19 recommends that the mechanism be effective only during the post-test years, and

⁶³ SoCalGas provided ORA with an Excel spreadsheet which shows how it developed its PSEP-related revenue forecast based on its PSEP capital expenditure forecast. The spreadsheet is not dynamically linked in a manner which generates alternate revenue forecasts based on different capital forecasts, so ORA was unable to rely on it in order to estimate ORA's PSEP-related revenue forecast based on its PSEP capital expenditure forecast. Therefore, ORA developed its estimate of PSEP-related revenues by relying on ratios and pro-rated amounts based on its forecast of PSEP capital additions relative to SoCalGas' forecasts.

⁶⁴ See Ex. ORA-34 for ORA's revised forecasts of attrition revenue increases for SoCalGas, with the impacts of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.

1 not for the test year. This is consistent with ORA’s recommendation in the PG&E
2 2014 and 2017 GRCs, which were adopted by the Commission.⁶⁵

3 ORA notes that:

- 4 • the Z-factor mechanism covers cost increases or decreases; and
- 5 • as stated in D.13-05-010, “[a]ny Z-factor costs that will result in an
6 increase in costs shall be filed as an application.”⁶⁶

7 **E. Rate Base Adjustments**

8 SDG&E and SoCalGas propose rate base adjustments “...for the phase down
9 of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 168(k) bonus depreciation and the repairs
10 deduction as ordered in D.16-06-054.”⁶⁷ ORA confirmed that adjustments were
11 ordered in D.16-06-054,⁶⁸ and does not oppose SDG&E’s and SoCalGas’
12 proposals. However, these adjustments may be re-evaluated in conjunction with the
13 new tax reform update.

14 **F. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act**

15 The Results of Operations (RO) Model that ORA used to generate its
16 Summary of Earnings and revenue requirement forecasts for its testimony served on
17 April 13, 2018, models the federal income corporate tax rate at 35% and bonus
18 depreciation⁶⁹ for 2017, 2018, and 2019 at 50%, 40%, and 30%, respectively.
19 However, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) lowered the corporate tax rate to 21%

⁶⁵ D.14-08-032, *mimeo.*, at p. 662 and D.17-05-013, *mimeo.*, at pp. 52-53.

⁶⁶ D.13-05-010, *mimeo.*, at p. 1011.

⁶⁷ Ex. SDG&E-43, p. KJD-6, lines 11-12; Ex. SCG-44, p. JAM-6, lines 7-9.

⁶⁸ D.16-06-054, *mimeo.*, at p. 192 and Appendix B, page 2 of 15.

⁶⁹ Bonus depreciation is a method of accelerated depreciation which allows a business to make an additional deduction of, for example, 50% of the cost of qualifying property in the year in which it is put into service. Bonus depreciation is typically taken in the first year that the depreciable item is placed in service.

1 and repealed bonus depreciation for utility property acquired after September 27,
2 2017.

3 The updated RO model which Sempra provided to ORA with its April 6, 2018
4 Tax Update testimony reflects the new corporate tax rate and bonus depreciation
5 provisions, and their impact on SDG&E's and SoCalGas' 2019 revenue requirement
6 requests. ORA's forecasts of SDG&E's and SoCalGas' test year and post-test year
7 revenue requirement, with the tax update, were developed using the April 2018 RO
8 model, and are presented in Ex. ORA-34 and Ex. ORA-35.

9 **VI. ORA's ALTERNATE POST-TEST YEAR RATEMAKING** 10 **MECHANISM**

11 If the Commission does not adopt ORA's primary recommendation of setting
12 fixed percentage increases for the Sempra Utilities' post-test year revenue
13 increases, and instead prefers a mechanism similar to their proposal, then ORA
14 recommends that the Commission adopt ORA's alternate recommendations,
15 discussed below.

16 **A. O&M Expense Adjustments**

17 SDG&E and SoCalGas propose escalating test year operating expenses by
18 using a weighted average escalation factor (based on IHS Markit) for labor and non-
19 labor costs, and a separate escalation factor (by Willis Towers Watson) for medical
20 costs.

21 **1. O&M (Labor and Non-Labor) Margin Escalation**

22 For simplicity in calculating post-test year escalation, the Sempra Utilities
23 developed a single weighted average factor for O&M (labor and non-labor)
24 escalation. SDG&E proposes O&M margin escalation rates of 2.66% for 2020,

1 2.59% for 2021, and 2.55% for 2022,⁷⁰ while SoCalGas proposes O&M margin
2 escalation rates of 2.70% for 2020, 2.58% for 2021, and 2.53% for 2022.⁷¹

3 ORA does not oppose this approach nor the forecasted rates. Given that
4 SDG&E and SoCalGas are proposing to update the O&M margin escalation rates,
5 the rates shown above serve as placeholders for the time being.

6 **2. O&M Escalation Rate Updates**

7 As previously discussed, SDG&E and SoCalGas intend to update their cost
8 escalation forecasts as part of their GRC Update Testimony. The Sempra Utilities
9 propose using the Global Insight forecasts available in June 2018 to determine the
10 2019 and post-test year labor and non-labor O&M escalation indices.⁷²

11 ORA generally does not oppose this request, but recommends that limits be
12 placed on how much the escalation rates can be automatically adjusted. Rather
13 than automatically allowing SDG&E and SoCalGas to account for prospective
14 changes in escalation rates, ORA recommends a cap which limits such changes to
15 no more than 100 basis points (1.00%) above the currently forecasted rates when
16 the Sempra Utilities update rates in June 2018.

17 For example, SoCalGas currently forecasts a 2.70% O&M margin escalation
18 rate, and the June 2018 update—which is two months after ORA serves its
19 testimony—should not allow the rate to exceed 3.70%.⁷³ ORA’s proposal still allows
20 SDG&E and SoCalGas to automatically adjust O&M margin escalation rates, still
21 allows SDG&E and SoCalGas to implement higher than currently forecasted rates
22 during the GRC cycle up to a certain level, and protects ratepayers against a “blank
23 check” approach if the June 18 forecasts of escalation rates are significantly higher
24 than current forecasts.

⁷⁰ Ex. SDG&E-43, p. KJD-5, line 10.

⁷¹ Ex. SCG-44, p. JAM-6, line 2.

⁷² Ex. SDG&E-43, p. KJD-5, lines 12-16; Ex. SCG-44, p. JAM-6, lines 4-8.

⁷³ Calculation: 2.70% + 1.00% = 3.70%.

1 If the June 2018 update exceeds the recommended 1.00% cap, SDG&E and
2 SoCalGas can file a Tier 2 advice letter to request, explain, and justify why a greater
3 change is necessary.

4 **3. Medical Cost Escalation**

5 SDG&E and SoCalGas forecast post-test year increases to medical
6 expenses, and propose medical escalation rates of 6.50% for 2020, 6.00% for 2021,
7 and 5.50% for 2022.⁷⁴ For the post-test years, ORA recommends a lower-cost
8 alternative to the Sempra Utilities' forecast, and proposes an annual medical
9 escalation rate of 4.25%, as recommended in Ex. ORA-22.

10 **B. Capital-Related Adjustments**

11 **1. GRC Incremental Adjustment**

12 The Sempra Utilities propose an adjustment to capital-related revenue
13 requirements to reflect the cost of post-test year capital additions, based on using
14 the escalated 5-year (2015-2019) average level of net plant additions (capital
15 additions net of retirements) as a proxy for the 2020, 2021, and 2022 level of net
16 plant additions.

17 ORA does not oppose the use of an escalated multi-year average of capital
18 additions as a proxy for post-test year capital additions, but recommends a 7-year
19 average (2013-2019) instead of Sempra's proposed 5-year average. The
20 Commission previously adopted the 7-year average methodology in PG&E's 2014
21 GRC, but has not adopted a 5-year average of capital additions as a proxy for post-
22 test year capital additions in any recent large energy utility GRC.

23 Sempra's proposed 5-year average relies more on forecasted capital
24 additions rather than recorded data (i.e., 2 years of recorded data, from 2015 and
25 2016, and 3 years of forecasts, for 2017-2019). ORA's recommendation of using a
26 7-year average from 2013-2019 seeks a more equitable balance, whereby two
27 additional years of recorded capital additions, from 2013 and 2014, are included as
28 part of the averaging methodology.

⁷⁴ Ex. SDG&E-43, p. KJD-6, line 2; Ex. SCG-44, p. JAM-6, line 20.

1 In calculating the 7-year average, ORA also recommends using the 2017
2 recorded capital additions, and the Commission-adopted 2018 and 2019 capital
3 additions forecasts, instead of SDG&E's and SoCalGas' 2017-2019 forecasts.
4 Using the actual capital additions from 2017 eliminates another year of forecast
5 uncertainty from the 7-year average.⁷⁵

6 **2. SoCalGas PSEP Adjustment**

7 SoCalGas proposes post-test year capital-related revenue requirement
8 adjustments associated with forecasted Pipeline Safety Enhance Plan (PSEP)
9 capital additions.

10 As discussed earlier, ORA does not oppose SoCalGas' request for post-test
11 year revenues associated with PSEP capital expenditures in 2020, 2021, and 2022,
12 but recommends that the Commission adopt ORA's PSEP capital expenditure
13 forecasts as presented in Ex. ORA-03. Based on those forecasts, ORA estimates
14 that the revenue requirement impact equals \$15.5 million, \$36.7 million, and \$44.7
15 million for 2020, 2021, and 2022, respectively.

16 **3. Rate Base**

17 ORA agrees with SDG&E's and SoCalGas' proposal to not adjust the rate
18 base elements of materials and supplies, customer advances, or working cash. As
19 previously indicated, ORA does not oppose the utilities' proposed rate base
20 adjustments for the phase down of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 168(k)
21 bonus depreciation and the repairs deduction as ordered in D.16-06-054.⁷⁶
22 However, these adjustments may be re-evaluated in conjunction with the new tax
23 reform update.

⁷⁵ Unless noted otherwise, ORA witnesses who are addressing the Sempra Utilities' capital expenditures have incorporated 2017 recorded capital expenditures into their forecasts.

⁷⁶ D.16-06-054, *mimeo.*, at p. 192 and Appendix B, page 2 of 15.

1

WITNESS QUALIFICATIONS

2 My name is Clayton K. Tang. My business address is 505 Van Ness Avenue,
3 San Francisco, California. I am employed by the Office of Ratepayer Advocates
4 (ORA) as a Program and Project Supervisor in the Energy Cost of Service and
5 Natural Gas Branch.

6 I received a Master of Business Administration degree from San Francisco
7 State University and a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from
8 San Jose State University. I am a registered Professional Engineer in Mechanical
9 Engineering in the State of California.

10 Since joining the Commission in 1986, I have worked on numerous general
11 rate cases (GRCs) in an advocacy role with ORA (1986-1997 and 2005-present),
12 and on various matters in an advisory role with the Energy Division (1997-2005). I
13 am one of ORA's Project Coordinators for this GRC.

14 This completes my prepared testimony.

ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1

December 19, 2012

ADVICE 2826-E
(U 338-E)

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ENERGY DIVISION

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Test Year 2012 General Rate Case (GRC) Adopted Revenue Requirement, 2013 GRC Post Test Year Revenue Requirement and Ratemaking Mechanisms in Accordance with Decision 12-11-051

In accordance with the California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission” or “CPUC”) Decision (D.) 12-11-051, Southern California Edison Company (SCE) hereby submits for filing the following changes to its tariff schedules. The revised tariff sheets and filed forms are listed on Attachment A and are attached hereto.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this advice filing is to (1) implement GRC-authorized revenue requirements for the 2012 Test Year and 2013 Post Test Year;¹ (2) modify the Preliminary Statement section of SCE’s tariffs to establish new ratemaking mechanisms, modify existing ratemaking mechanisms, and eliminate those ratemaking mechanisms no longer needed consistent with D.12-11-051; (3) set forth the entries recorded in the 2012 GRC Revenue Requirement Memorandum Account; and (4) implement Commission-authorized Other Operating Revenue (OOR) fees.

BACKGROUND

On November 23, 2010, SCE filed Application (A.) 10-11-015 requesting, among other things, an increase in its base revenue requirements for the 2012 Test Year and 2013 and 2014 Post Test Years. SCE’s base revenue requirements include the costs of operating, maintaining, and investing in SCE’s generation, distribution, and general functions, and exclude costs of fuel and power procurement.

¹ SCE has identified some errors in the Results of Operations model. SCE intends to work in collaboration with the Commission’s Energy Division to determine if and when these errors will be corrected and filed via a subsequent advice letter.

Party Implemented Projects, Form 14-905; and On-Bill Financing Agreement Local Government/Institutional Customer Projects, Form 14-914 are revised to reflect a return check charge of \$8.00.

GRC REVENUE REQUIREMENT CHANGE

Table 6 below summarizes the net revenue requirement change that will be reflected in SCE’s 2012 and 2013 rate levels as the result of implementing D.12-11-051. As shown on Line No. 2 of Table 6, the 2012 Authorized Base Revenue Requirement (ABRR) is \$5.671 billion. In order to determine the GRC-related revenue requirement increase, there are several adjustments that need to be made to the 2011 GRC-related ABRR. These adjustments are shown on Line Nos. 4 and 5 of Table 6. The authorized 2012 ABRR increase of \$338 million is shown on line 7 of Table 6.

The 2012 ABRR increase is then adjusted for 2013 to reflect: 1) recovery of the \$389 million, 2012 balance recorded in the GRC Memorandum Account; 2) an increase of \$351 million to include the 2013 post test-year change pursuant to D.12-11-051; 3) the change in GRC-related balancing accounts for 2012; 4) the change in the other Commission authorized revenue requirements (e.g. ERRAs) as the result of the FF&U factors adopted in D.12-11-051; and 5) a reduction for the Edison SmartConnect™ revenue requirement included in 2012 rate levels.

Table 6			
Southern California Edison Company			
Revenue Requirement Change (D.12-11-051)			
		(\$millions)	Authority
1. 2012 Increase			
2.	2012 Authorized Base Revenue Requirement	5,671	D.12-11-051
3.	2011 Authorized Base Revenue Requirement	5,202	D.09-03-025
4.	Plus: 2 Refuelings (2011 Rev Rqmt In 2012 Rates)	103	
5.	Solar PV Rev Rqmt In 2012 Rates	28	
6.	Subtotal (In Rates Prior To 2012 GRC Decision)	5,333	
7.	2012 Base Revenue Requirement Increase	338	(Line No. 2 - Line No. 6)
8. 2013 Increase			
9.	Plus: 2012 GRC Memorandum Account	389	
10.	2013 Post Test-Year Increase	351	D.12-11-051 (\$6.022M for 2013 - \$5.671M for 2012)
11.	GRC-Related Balancing Accounts	(2)	(Pensions, PBOP, Palo Verde, and Medical Programs)
12.	FF&U on all non-GRC Rev. Rqmts	(1)	
13.	Less: Edison SmartConnect™ in 2012 Rates	188	
14.			
15.	2013 Base Revenue Requirement Increase	549	(Sum of Line Nos. 9 through 12 - Line No. 13)
16.			
17.	Combined 2012 and 2013 Increase	887	(Line No. 7 + Line No. 15)

SCE plans to implement the authorized 2013 ABRR of \$6.022 billion in rates on January 1, 2013. The overall combined 2012 and 2013 GRC-related increase above the 2011 GRC revenue requirement is \$887 million.

Attachment 2

US Economic Outlook

January 2018




Table 2

Summary of the US Economy

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Composition of Real GDP, Percent Change													
Gross Domestic Product	2.5	1.6	2.2	1.7	2.8	2.9	1.5	2.2	2.7	2.6	2.0	1.8	2.0
Final Sales of Domestic Product	1.1	1.7	2.1	1.5	2.7	2.6	1.9	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.1	1.9	2.0
Gross Domestic Income	2.7	2.2	3.3	1.2	3.1	3.0	0.9	1.7	2.5	2.6	2.0	1.8	2.0
Avg. of GDP and GDI	2.6	1.9	2.7	1.5	2.8	2.9	1.2	2.0	2.6	2.6	2.0	1.8	2.0
Total Consumption	1.9	2.3	1.5	1.5	2.9	3.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.2
Durables	6.1	6.1	7.4	6.2	6.9	7.7	5.5	6.5	5.8	3.9	3.7	3.4	3.9
Nondurables	2.2	1.8	0.6	1.7	2.5	3.1	2.8	2.4	2.8	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.2
Services	1.2	1.8	0.8	0.6	2.4	3.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.0	1.9	1.9
Nonresidential Fixed Investment	2.5	7.7	9.0	3.5	6.9	2.3	-0.6	4.8	5.5	5.0	3.5	2.8	2.4
Equipment	15.9	13.6	10.8	4.6	6.6	3.5	-3.4	5.1	7.9	6.0	4.0	2.7	1.8
Information Processing Equipment	9.9	1.6	6.0	4.8	3.7	4.3	1.8	7.7	7.7	5.7	3.7	3.0	2.9
Industrial Equipment	-0.5	21.1	9.0	-1.5	4.2	1.1	2.3	8.2	12.7	6.9	4.9	3.6	2.4
Transportation equipment	94.0	33.7	-19.6	11.0	11.7	10.4	-7.3	-0.3	0.7	4.6	4.1	1.1	-1.4
Aircraft	24.7	26.5	-4.7	8.3	10.9	5.9	-25.1	19.7	14.4	16.3	5.6	3.3	3.3
Other Equipment	8.6	10.9	-11.2	3.9	7.1	-2.6	-9.8	5.2	11.7	7.1	3.3	3.0	3.2
Intellectual Property Products	1.9	3.6	3.9	3.4	4.6	3.8	6.3	4.2	4.3	3.7	3.0	2.7	2.9
Structures	-16.4	2.3	12.9	1.4	10.5	-1.8	-4.1	5.2	2.6	4.6	3.4	3.2	2.6
Commercial & Health Care	-24.9	-0.5	8.6	3.5	12.9	10.6	14.6	4.2	5.2	9.4	-0.2	2.0	4.2
Manufacturing	-27.5	-4.2	14.8	4.1	13.0	33.8	-6.4	-13.6	2.2	10.4	2.7	-1.4	-3.8
Power & Communication	-16.1	-7.8	21.0	-4.4	15.0	-3.4	4.6	-6.2	-3.9	-3.4	-3.2	-2.8	-2.2
Mining & Petroleum	17.1	26.4	11.7	1.8	6.5	-28.5	-43.2	55.9	1.8	1.6	16.9	15.1	7.7
Other	-26.7	-9.4	9.5	4.3	7.1	10.5	7.4	2.4	6.5	3.8	4.2	1.5	2.3
Residential Fixed Investment	-2.5	0.5	13.5	11.9	3.5	10.2	5.5	1.7	2.7	5.3	4.7	2.8	2.4
Exports	11.9	6.9	3.4	3.5	4.3	0.4	-0.3	3.4	5.3	4.3	3.7	3.4	3.5
Imports	12.7	5.5	2.2	1.1	4.5	5.0	1.3	3.8	6.2	4.8	4.2	3.8	3.1
Federal Government	4.3	-2.7	-1.9	-5.8	-2.4	-0.1	0.0	-0.2	-0.4	-0.2	0.0	-0.3	0.0
State & Local Government	-2.7	-3.3	-1.9	-0.8	0.5	2.3	1.2	0.0	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.8
Billions of Dollars													
Real GDP	14783.8	15020.6	15354.6	15612.2	16013.3	16471.5	16718.2	17091.6	17546.7	17995.1	18363.4	18698.3	19066.3
Nominal GDP	14964.4	15517.9	16155.3	16691.5	17427.6	18120.7	18624.5	19382.4	20301.2	21288.5	22237.8	23162.9	24144.1
Prices & Wages, Percent Change													
GDP Deflator	1.2	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.1	1.3	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.2
Consumer Prices	1.6	3.1	2.1	1.5	1.8	0.1	1.3	2.1	1.7	1.9	2.8	2.6	2.4
Producer Prices, Finished Goods	4.2	6.0	1.9	1.2	1.9	-3.3	-1.0	3.2	2.3	1.7	3.0	2.3	2.3
Employment Cost Index - Total Comp.	1.9	2.2	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.5	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.4
Other Key Measures													
Brent Crude, Spot Price (\$/bbl)	79.91	110.96	111.77	108.74	99.83	52.68	44.24	54.81	58.71	57.58	67.03	73.16	78.62
Productivity (%ch.)	3.3	0.1	0.9	0.3	1.0	1.2	0.0	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.5
Total Industrial Production (%ch.)	5.5	3.1	2.9	2.0	3.1	-0.7	-1.2	1.9	3.3	3.0	2.2	1.8	2.1
Factory Operating Rate	70.7	73.7	74.8	74.7	75.4	75.5	75.1	75.7	77.0	77.1	76.8	76.1	76.1
Nonfarm Inven. Chg. (Bil. 2009 \$)	65.9	36.6	72.7	73.0	74.0	102.8	34.5	15.0	45.2	64.2	55.6	50.7	51.7
Consumer Sentiment Index	71.8	67.4	76.5	79.2	84.1	92.9	91.8	96.8	99.7	99.2	97.6	97.4	97.2
Light Vehicle Sales (Mil. units)	11.55	12.74	14.43	15.53	16.45	17.40	17.47	17.15	16.93	16.85	16.81	16.64	16.51
Housing Starts (Mil. units)	0.586	0.612	0.764	0.928	1.001	1.107	1.177	1.211	1.289	1.402	1.449	1.473	1.496
Exist. House Sales (Total, Mil. units)	4.183	4.277	4.657	5.078	4.923	5.234	5.440	5.548	5.712	5.836	5.980	6.042	6.036
Unemployment Rate (%)	9.6	8.9	8.1	7.4	6.2	5.3	4.9	4.4	3.9	3.7	3.8	4.1	4.3
Payroll Employment (%ch.)	-0.7	1.2	1.7	1.6	1.9	2.1	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.5	0.7	0.3	0.4
Federal Surplus (Unified, FY, bil. \$)	-1294.2	-1296.8	-1089.2	-680.2	-483.6	-439.1	-587.4	-665.7	-687.7	-974.0	-1023.1	-1133.4	-1273.3
Current Account Balance (Bil. \$)	-430.7	-444.6	-426.2	-349.5	-373.8	-434.6	-451.7	-460.7	-476.8	-474.1	-515.6	-535.7	-538.5
Financial Markets, NSA, Quarter Average													
Federal Funds Rate (%)	0.18	0.10	0.14	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.40	1.00	1.82	2.52	3.09	3.45	3.45
3-Month Treasury Bill Rate (%)	0.14	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.32	0.93	1.69	2.28	2.78	3.10	3.10
10-Year Treasury Note Yield (%)	3.21	2.79	1.80	2.35	2.54	2.14	1.84	2.33	3.01	3.54	3.72	3.72	3.69
30-Year Fixed Mortgage Rate (%)	4.69	4.46	3.66	3.98	4.17	3.65	3.65	3.99	4.54	5.05	5.31	5.39	5.38
S&P 500 Stock Index	1139	1269	1380	1643	1931	2061	2092	2448	2677	2625	2631	2685	2761
(Percent change)	20.3	11.4	8.7	19.1	17.5	6.8	1.5	17.0	9.4	-2.0	0.2	2.0	2.8
Exchange Rate, Broad Index of Partners	0.964	0.920	0.945	0.956	0.986	1.109	1.161	1.158	1.154	1.166	1.171	1.173	1.170
(% change, annual rate)	-3.8	-4.6	2.8	1.1	3.1	12.5	4.7	-0.3	-0.3	1.0	0.4	0.2	-0.3
Incomes													
Personal Income (% ch.)	3.2	6.2	5.0	1.1	5.3	5.0	2.4	3.1	4.4	5.2	5.0	4.6	4.4
Real Disposable Income (%ch.)	1.0	2.5	3.1	-1.4	3.6	4.2	1.4	1.3	3.8	3.7	2.5	2.5	2.3
Saving Rate (%)	5.6	6.1	7.6	5.0	5.7	6.1	4.9	3.5	4.3	5.3	5.5	5.8	5.9
After-Tax Profits (Billions of \$)	1470	1428	1683	1688	1744	1851	1688	1832	1987	2072	2082	2114	2159
(Percent change)	22.2	-2.9	17.9	0.3	3.3	-5.3	2.2	8.5	8.5	4.3	0.5	1.6	2.1

Source: IHS Markit

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